Before testimony began, the court formally addressed a stipulation of facts agreed to by Lindsay Clancy and the Commonwealth. Judge John Canavan questioned Clancy directly under oath to ensure she understood what she was agreeing to and that her decision was voluntary.

Clancy acknowledged that by entering the stipulation, she was relieving the prosecution of its burden to independently prove the stipulated facts and giving up certain rights specifically as to those facts, including the right to confront witnesses or present evidence contesting them. She confirmed that she had reviewed the agreement with her attorney, had sufficient time to discuss it, and was entering it voluntarily.

The judge found Clancy competent and concluded that she had knowingly, intelligently, willingly, and voluntarily entered into the agreement.

Defense counsel then explained the practical reason for the stipulation: the defense was not contesting matters such as chain of custody, blood and fluid evidence, the exercise bands, DNA, and similar foundational evidence. Without the agreement, the Commonwealth could have been required to call dozens of additional witnesses simply to establish those facts. The stipulation therefore avoided potentially days of largely uncontested testimony.

Dr. Jhilam Biswas — Brigham & Women’s Hospital

Dr. Jhilam Biswas, a forensic psychiatrist who also works as an adult psychiatrist on the consultation-liaison service at Brigham & Women’s Hospital, evaluated Lindsay Clancy on January 26, 2023. Biswas emphasized that she saw Clancy in her capacity as a hospital psychiatrist, not as a forensic evaluator retained to assess her criminal responsibility.

At the time, Clancy was in the ICU, awake but still intubated and awaiting spinal surgery. Because she could not speak, she communicated with Biswas by writing on paper. When asked about her mood, Clancy wrote “horrified.” What she meant by that was not explored. The testimony does not establish whether she was referring to what had happened to her children, her own catastrophic injuries and paralysis, or the situation generally. Nor did Biswas establish during this testimony what Clancy remembered about January 24 or what she may already have been told about the children.

Clancy’s other written questions included whether she had an attorney, whether her body was broken, whether her legs were straight, whether she could have visitors, and where her family was. Biswas testified that Clancy appeared to understand the questions being asked and that her responses were appropriate to her circumstances.

Biswas documented Clancy’s thought process as linear, goal-directed and thoughtful and observed no signs that she was responding to internal stimuli, such as hallucinations or voices. She saw no disorganized thinking or other outward signs of psychosis during the encounter and believed Clancy had the capacity to make decisions concerning her upcoming surgery.

The limits of that assessment were significant. Biswas saw Clancy only once, for approximately 20–30 minutes, while she was intubated, exhausted, anxious, seriously injured and preparing for surgery. On cross-examination, Biswas acknowledged that psychosis does not necessarily present continuously and that some patients experiencing psychosis can have periods of clarity. She also did not have Clancy’s complete psychiatric treatment history available to her.

Accordingly, Biswas’s testimony establishes that she did not observe signs of psychosis during this brief January 26 evaluation; it does not establish Clancy’s mental state at the time of the children’s deaths two days earlier.

Sgt. Robert Flynn — Initial Scene Security

Duxbury Police Sgt. Robert Flynn responded to 47 Summer Street and participated in the initial security sweep of the home before Massachusetts State Police took over the investigation. Flynn described the scene as chaotic and testified that officers swept all three floors to ensure there were no additional victims or suspects. He observed the takeout food in the kitchen, children’s snacks still on the couch, the open upstairs bedroom window and the disturbed snow and medical equipment below it. He later returned after execution of the search warrant to close and secure the bedroom window.

Trooper Mark Farioli and Leah O’Connell — Blood and Urine Evidence

Trooper Mark Farioli collected six vials of Clancy’s blood and one vial of urine from South Shore Hospital on January 31 and transported them to the Massachusetts State Police laboratory. Leah O’Connell, then a forensic evidence technician, received, logged, sealed and refrigerated the samples. The parties stipulated to the chain of custody.

Capt. John Santos — Search of the Clancy Home

John Santos, then assigned to the Plymouth County State Police Detective Unit, participated in the January 24 search of the Clancy home. In a kitchen cabinet, investigators recovered McLean Hospital discharge paperwork, postpartum depression and anxiety information, medication records, the book Good Moms Have Scary Thoughts, a postpartum anxiety workbook and a notebook containing communications concerning the baby.

Santos also participated in searching the master bedroom but did not search the nightstand drawer beside the bed. The defense again highlighted that investigators recovered medications and electronic devices elsewhere in the home but failed to seize the numerous pill bottles, sleep aids and Apple Watch later found inside that drawer. Santos could not say whether another investigator had searched it and decided the contents were irrelevant or whether it had simply been missed.

Trooper Cory Melo — Lindsay Clancy’s Journals

Trooper Cory Melo participated in the search of the home and later reviewed journals and notebooks recovered during the investigation. The entries provide a contemporaneous account, in Clancy’s own handwriting, of her mental and emotional state during the months preceding January 24.

The Commonwealth highlighted entries describing Clancy becoming obsessed with Callan’s sleep and nap schedule, saying “I want to die” during the distress of sleep training, developing severe insomnia and anxiety, feeling guilty about her baby’s development, feeling overwhelmed caring for three children and writing that she felt as though she were “drowning every day.”

On cross-examination, however, the defense presented substantially more of the journals. Clancy described severe insomnia, anxiety, depression, brain fog, loss of appetite and difficulty making or carrying out plans. She wrote that she felt disconnected from her baby and herself, worried about returning to work, questioned whether medication withdrawal was contributing to her symptoms and repeatedly expressed a desire to get better: “I want help. I want to be well.”

Other entries reflected intense guilt surrounding Callan’s sleep training, stopping breastfeeding, his illnesses and milestones, her marriage, finances and her ability to care for all three children. She described her mind as constantly running through what everyone needed and wrote that she was desperate for a mental break from taking care of everyone.

By late November, some entries shifted toward affirmations and attempts at recovery. Clancy wrote that she was calm, would sleep, planned to return to work and believed she would “thrive” and begin feeling like herself again. She also expressed gratitude for Patrick and family members helping her.

There are also those November affirmations:

“I am calm. I will remain calm today.”

And the next day she wrote that she’d slept well, expected to sleep again, was going back to work, and believed she would thrive and feel like herself again.

The portions of the journals presented through Melo document substantial anxiety, insomnia, depression, guilt, obsessive thinking and feelings of being overwhelmed. No homicidal ideation toward the children was identified in the journal passages presented during this testimony.

The defense also questioned Melo about the master-bedroom search. Melo had personally searched portions of the bedroom but could not explain why investigators failed to recover the medications, sleep aids and Apple Watch from the nightstand drawer.

Dr. Sejal Shah — Psychiatry

She first personally evaluated Lindsay on January 29. By then Lindsay was speaking.

And this wasn’t casual bedside interaction. Shah conducted an actual psychiatric and cognitive evaluation, including assessment of Lindsay’s ability to make decisions.

January 29 — confused, but communicating coherently

Lindsay was sufficiently communicative to tell Shah that she wanted to change her healthcare proxy: FROM: Patrick TO: her parents. She explained why.

Her parents were supportive, lived nearby, were involved in her life, and she believed they would act in her best interests.

That demonstrates considerably more sophisticated cognition than squeezing someone’s hand or writing “can’t feel legs.”

However, Shah also diagnosed delirium that day.

Lindsay had undergone major spinal surgery, had oxygen desaturation, tachycardia and recent anesthesia. She had experienced transient visual hallucinations overnight.

Importantly, Shah attributed those hallucinations to the context of medical delirium and testified that they resolved.

They delayed finalizing the healthcare proxy change until Lindsay could be reassessed.

January 30 — delirium resolved

Her choice to remove Patrick as healthcare proxy and substitute her parents remained consistent. She was therefore considered capable of making that decision.

So by January 30, we have very strong clinical evidence that Lindsay was:

conscious;
verbally communicative;
understanding information;
able to reason;
able to express consistent choices;
no longer delirious.

February 21 — Lindsay discusses “what she had done”

During Shah’s February 21 evaluation, Lindsay reported feeling down about her current situation, her paralysis, and the events leading to her hospitalization. 

Shah documented that Lindsay said her thoughts about “what she had done” were not constant throughout the day.

The prosecutor then made the meaning explicit: “So she wasn’t thinking about killing her children throughout the day every day?” Shah answered: “Correct.”

Lindsay continued to deny suicidal or homicidal intent, auditory or visual hallucinations, and paranoid ideation. Shah noted Lindsay’s low mood in the context of her physical and legal situation, but concluded that she did not meet the criteria for a major depressive episode.

The prosecutor then summarized Lindsay’s apparent focus as her physical situation, legal situation, and anticipation of going to Spaulding, and Shah agreed.

February 22 

Shah’s evaluation on this day reported that Lindsay remained:

hopeful about treatment at Spaulding
future-oriented
without suicidal or homicidal ideation
without auditory or visual hallucinations

February 19 — Psychiatric evaluation before transfer to Spaulding

Dr. Sejal Shah met with Lindsay again on February 19 as the hospital prepared for her eventual transfer to Spaulding Rehabilitation Hospital. Psychiatry was continuing to assess her safety, suicide/homicide risk, medications, and overall mental status.

At this point, Lindsay:

denied suicidal or homicidal intent;
denied auditory or visual hallucinations;
denied confusion or disorientation;
described her mood as “okay”;
was described as future-oriented;
said she was looking forward to transferring to Spaulding for rehabilitation.

This is important because by this stage Shah was not observing ongoing psychosis, delirium, or a major disturbance in Lindsay’s thought process.

Cross-examination — Defense points

Reddington first established something potentially important for the defense: Shah considered Lindsay an honest patient in reporting her psychiatric symptoms. Shah did not believe Lindsay was exaggerating symptoms for legal advantage. In fact, Lindsay repeatedly denied hallucinations, suicidal ideation, and homicidal ideation rather than claiming symptoms she wasn’t experiencing.

Reddington then turned to postpartum psychosis. Shah agreed that a psychotic person does not necessarily look obviously incapacitated. Someone experiencing psychosis can still communicate, converse normally with family and friends, formulate plans, and carry out those plans.

In other words, organized behavior does not by itself rule out psychosis.

Bipolar disorder/hypomania – Reddington next explored bipolar disorder. Shah explained that bipolar illness can include depressive episodes and manic or hypomanic episodes. Symptoms can include:

dramatically decreased need for sleep;
high energy;
irritability;
impulsivity;
racing thoughts;
feeling out of control;
and, in severe episodes, psychosis.

Hypomania is a lesser degree of mania and does not necessarily include psychosis. Reddington asked whether behaviors such as getting up early to exercise, cleaning out the house or garage, selling belongings, and staying awake through the night could be associated with hypomania.

Shah agreed they could be. That’s clearly the defense trying to reinterpret some of Lindsay’s seemingly productive/organized behavior before January 24 as possible evidence of an emerging mood disorder.

Medication history

Reddington then walked Shah through the long list of psychiatric medications Lindsay had been prescribed between roughly September and January—including antidepressants, benzodiazepines, mood stabilizers, Seroquel, sleep medications and others. He established that certain antidepressants carry warnings concerning increased suicidality and explored the potential complications of antidepressant treatment in someone with bipolar disorder.

But there was an important qualification: Shah testified that antidepressants can be prescribed to bipolar patients, often in conjunction with another medication intended to provide protection against destabilization.

Reddington attempted to characterize the overall history as an extraordinary number of medications in four months:

“It’s an awful lot of drugs to be prescribed in four months, isn’t it?”

Objection sustained. So he didn’t get Shah’s agreement with that characterization.

Commonwealth redirect — important cleanup

The prosecutor immediately clarified something that matters enormously when we eventually write the medication section:

Lindsay was not taking all of those medications simultaneously.

Some had been discontinued. Some she had taken only briefly, and some prescriptions apparently had barely been used at all.

The prosecutor specifically referenced Buspar prescriptions where only two pills were taken from one bottle and none from another.

Shah acknowledged that her information came from medical records, previous providers and Lindsay herself and that she didn’t necessarily know precisely how much Lindsay had actually taken of every historical prescription.

Immediately before January 24, Shah understood Lindsay’s active prescriptions to be only trazodone, Valium and amitriptyline.

That’s important because Reddington’s questioning creates the impression of this enormous cocktail of psychiatric drugs, whereas the Commonwealth essentially says: That’s a list of prescriptions across four months—not what was simultaneously in her medicine cabinet regimen or found in her system on January 24.

Commonwealth challenges the “mania” examples.

The prosecutor then went back through the behaviors Reddington had suggested might indicate hypomania.

Shah agreed:

Exercising every day doesn’t mean someone is manic.

Cleaning a messy garage doesn’t mean someone is manic.

Selling possessions you no longer need doesn’t mean someone is manic.

And there was an interesting distinction regarding organization.

Someone experiencing mania might approach a major task in a disorganized manner and fail to finish it. By contrast, methodically sorting garage items into keep / sell / throw away categories is organized behavior.

Shah agreed.

Likewise, selling unwanted junk is quite different from irrationally selling something essential—Shah agreed with the prosecutor’s example of selling your stove and then having nothing to cook with.

Defense re-cross — puts the behaviors back into context

Reddington had one legitimate comeback. He essentially said: don’t evaluate those behaviors individually. A person exercising or cleaning the garage isn’t necessarily hypomanic. But what if that same person is also:

suffering insomnia severe enough to go 48 hours without sleep;
saying “my brain is broken”;
unable to concentrate or think;
experiencing suicidal ideation;
and reporting thoughts about hurting her children?

Should those facts be considered together when conducting a psychiatric evaluation? Shah said yes.

That’s probably Reddington’s strongest point from this portion. He’s arguing for a constellation of symptoms, rather than claiming that garage cleaning = mania.

He also returned briefly to Lindsay’s rapidly changing medications and established that Shah wasn’t personally familiar with every instruction Lindsay’s earlier providers had given her about stopping one medication and beginning another.

DNR request

Finally, Reddington returned to Lindsay’s request for Do Not Resuscitate status. Shah clarified that Lindsay made the request the day after Shah’s initial capacity evaluation concerning the healthcare proxy. Because Lindsay had been hospitalized following what was reported as a serious suicide attempt, the psychiatric team would not immediately change her code status. Instead, they continued discussing it with her.

Lindsay eventually agreed that it made sense to make sure her mental health was stable before reconsidering DNR status.

Rachelle Amede — Night ICU Nurse

Amede is especially valuable because she cared for Lindsay beginning with her first night at Brigham and then on several later overnight shifts.

January 24 into January 25 — not responsive

Lindsay arrived in the trauma surgical ICU intubated and sedated after going through the ER and MRI. Amede testified Lindsay was not responsive during that first night.

At approximately 3:30 a.m. January 25, Lindsay suffered a cardiac arrest. Her blood pressure dropped to a level incompatible with life; CPR was performed, chest tubes were placed, additional pressors were administered, and a massive transfusion protocol was initiated.

January 26 — first evidence of meaningful responsiveness

Lindsay was still intubated and sedated, but she could be aroused and could understand and follow simple commands.

Amede could tell her:

squeeze my hand;
move/wiggle as directed;
perform basic neurological commands.

Lindsay could move her arms and head, although not her lower extremities because of the spinal injury.

So by January 26, we have evidence that Lindsay was at least intermittently conscious enough to hear, understand and respond appropriately to spoken instructions.

January 28 — first documented communication with Amede

Reddington specifically pinned Amede down:

Was it January 28th that she used for the first time the whiteboard to communicate?

Amede: “Yes.”

Lindsay was still intubated and therefore couldn’t speak, but she could write on a whiteboard.

“And what did she communicate?”

She said she was confused and couldn’t feel her lower extremities.

Lindsay wasn’t merely obeying commands. She was initiating communication about her own condition.

According to Amede’s testimony:

No question about Patrick.
No question about the children.
No reference to what happened at home.

There’s an important limitation: on redirect, the Commonwealth established that Amede only knew what Lindsay communicated to her. She couldn’t say whether Lindsay had used the whiteboard with another nurse.

January 28/29 — extubation

By the end of Amede’s shift around this period, Lindsay was extubated and sedation stopped.

By January 30, Amede described her as:

alert;
oriented;
cooperative;
able to converse;
flat in affect;
still reporting sleep problems.

So by January 30 there is absolutely no question that Lindsay was capable of ordinary verbal communication.

And still, Amede testified to no discussion of the children.

On February 2 Lindsay asked Amede to contact her lawyer.

Amede specifically remembered and documented it because:

“That was the first time she referred to anything going on with the case or whatever.”

That’s a pretty important statement.

Amede had cared for her repeatedly and had engaged in casual conversation with her after extubation. Yet according to this nurse, February 2 was the first time Lindsay said anything to her concerning the case.

And what Lindsay raised was her attorney, not the children.

Again—this doesn’t establish she hadn’t discussed the children with someone else. But within Amede’s personal observations, that’s the chronology.

Meghan Collins — Day ICU Nurse

Collins fills some of Amede’s gaps because she was Lindsay’s primary day-shift nurse, generally 7 a.m.–7 p.m.

January 25

Collins took over after Lindsay’s cardiac arrest. Lindsay remained intubated and deliberately heavily sedated because she was critically ill. Responses were described as minimal, intentionally so.

January 26

Still intubated. Additional sedation was required because Lindsay wasn’t tolerating the tube.

January 29 — ICU delirium

After extubation, Collins observed:

increased confusion;
agitation;
pulling/picking at lines and drains;
need for restraints.

Collins specifically identified this as ICU delirium, something commonly seen after critical illness/intubation. And she said it improved over the next several days.

Dr. Kelley McDonough — South Shore Hospital ER

Dr. Kelley McDonough was an emergency medicine physician at South Shore Hospital and treated Lindsay after she arrived on January 24 as a Trauma 1 patient following the fall from the second-story window.

Lindsay arrived breathing on her own. McDonough recalled her as nonverbal with her eyes open; she responded to painful stimuli and moved her arms, but there was concern about a serious spinal injury. She was intubated for airway protection because doctors were concerned that a possible head injury could cause her condition to deteriorate.

The most important findings from the Commonwealth’s direct examination were:

No obvious external head injury — no bleeding, lacerations or abrasions.
Her head CT/CTA was essentially normal, with no significant intracranial findings.
She had very serious thoracic spinal injuries, which ultimately required transfer to a tertiary-care hospital.
The wounds to Lindsay’s neck and both wrists were characterized by McDonough as superficial.
McDonough saw no arterial or venous injury associated with the wounds and no active bleeding requiring emergency treatment.
The wounds never began actively bleeding again while McDonough was treating her.
Lindsay required no surgery at South Shore Hospital before being stabilized and transferred.
Lindsay was severely hypothermic — the testimony referenced a core temperature of approximately 82.1°F — and was treated with a warming device known as a Bair Hugger.
McDonough could not say what caused the hypothermia.

That wrist/neck testimony seems quite deliberate on the Commonwealth’s part. They’re establishing medically that although Lindsay had cut herself, those wounds were not the life-threatening component of her injuries. Her catastrophic injuries came from the fall.

Then Reddington takes it somewhere else

His cross seems aimed primarily at establishing just how profoundly injured and neurologically compromised Lindsay was after the fall.

He initially tried to characterize her as unconscious. McDonough corrected him: her eyes were open and she was nonverbal, but she responded to pain. He then moved through neurological signs, her spinal injuries, her extremely low body temperature, and injuries that apparently became more consequential later at Brigham.

And this is where the friction starts.

When McDonough repeatedly couldn’t recall specifics without looking at the records, Reddington pressed:

“I’m sure you’re very busy, but this is a murder trial. Doctor, did you review your records and your notes?”

McDonough shot back:

“Sorry, I did, but I don’t have a photographic memory.”

More substantively, Reddington elicited or raised several significant points:

Neurological condition: Lindsay never regained consciousness while she was at South Shore, according to McDonough. However, she did respond to painful stimulation before intubation.

Spinal injury: Reddington brought out what he described from the records as a complete transection around T5–T6. McDonough remembered the thoracic injury but repeatedly needed the records for its exact details.

Hypothermia: He emphasized the extraordinary 82-degree core temperature and got McDonough to acknowledge that hypothermia can cause significant metabolic dysfunction.

Other serious medical events: Reddington asked whether McDonough knew Lindsay later suffered cardiac arrest or required a massive blood transfusion at Brigham. She did not.

Possible CSF leakage/head trauma: He asked whether clear fluid from Lindsay’s nose could represent cerebrospinal fluid from a skull fracture. McDonough agreed that it could, but importantly testified that she did not observe clear fluid coming from Lindsay’s nose.

Wrist wounds: Reddington attempted to characterize them as “deep lacerations.” McDonough expressly disagreed: “I wouldn’t characterize them as deep.”

He tried to upgrade the severity of the self-inflicted cuts, and his own witness examination didn’t get him there.

Commonwealth redirect cleans up the cross

The prosecutor then handed McDonough her actual notes. After reviewing them, McDonough confirmed there was nothing notable about Lindsay’s pupils and testified that this indicated no obvious head injury or brain herniation. Her notes also contained no mention of cerebrospinal fluid.

McDonough reiterated that Lindsay’s wrist wounds were superficial because she saw no active bleeding, exposed muscle tissue, or tendon injury.

And the Commonwealth made another useful point: McDonough was an ER physician. Her job was not to definitively diagnose and treat every spinal injury Lindsay had. Her role was to assess, stabilize and transfer her to the appropriate higher-level facility. That explains some of the “I don’t recall” answers Reddington was hammering on.

What each side accomplished

The Commonwealth got the cleaner testimony from McDonough. Lindsay had catastrophic injuries from the fall, but there was no apparent traumatic brain injury on imaging, and her self-inflicted neck and wrist wounds were not medically severe.

The defense did establish something important, though: Lindsay’s overall physical condition after the fall was extraordinarily serious. She had catastrophic spinal trauma, profound hypothermia, impaired responsiveness, and apparently became even more medically unstable later.

But I think Reddington sometimes blurred “severely injured” with “brain injured.” McDonough’s testimony actually distinguished the two. Lindsay could have an absolutely devastating spinal injury and be critically ill without having sustained the type of structural head/brain injury Reddington appeared to be probing for. The imaging did not give him that.

And the CSF questioning didn’t really go anywhere because he established what CSF leakage could mean and then established that McDonough didn’t see any.

Sgt. Rose Stofers — Crime Scene Documentation

This witness is mostly foundational, but she gives us one interesting observation.

Massachusetts State Police Sgt. Rose Stofers arrived at South Shore Hospital at approximately 8:35 p.m. Her job was to photograph Lindsay, document her injuries and photograph the areas from which forensic scientist Maureen Hartnett collected swabs. [We remember Hartnett from the Karen Read trial]

Lindsay was under blankets and warming equipment and wearing a cervical collar. The room was very hot because medical staff were attempting to raise her body temperature.

When Stofers attempted to pull Lindsay’s right arm from underneath the blanket for photographs, however, Lindsay was “uncooperative,” pulled the arm back, and was “fighting against us a little.” Nurses had to assist.

This is an independent observation at approximately 8:35 p.m., after the earlier ER neurological assessment. We shouldn’t overinterpret what the movement means, but factually, she was capable of physically resisting someone attempting to move her arm.

Stofers photographed Lindsay’s face, neck, hands, wrists, clothing and two rings. She observed reddish-brown staining on Lindsay’s hands and gauze covering the wrist wounds. Her role was documentation; she did not collect the personal belongings herself.

She later testified that on February 6, 2023, she went to the Plymouth Detective Unit and photographed a bag containing medications and documents that had already been brought there. She had not participated in the search of the Clancy home.

Reddington’s cross was extremely brief and mainly clarified that point.

Dr. Michael Snyder — Beth Israel Deaconess Plymouth

Dr. Michael Snyder, an emergency physician, treated 5-year-old Cora Clancy when she arrived at Beth Israel on January 24, 2023.

Cora arrived in cardiac arrest, without a heartbeat and not breathing on her own. CPR had been ongoing, she had received epinephrine, and paramedics had attempted defibrillation twice. Snyder observed a bluish discoloration consistent with lack of oxygen, bruising around her neck, petechiae around her eyes and neck, blood from her nose, and fixed, dilated pupils.

The emergency team intubated her and continued CPR, medications, and other resuscitative efforts for approximately 30 minutes, but they were unsuccessful. Snyder pronounced Cora dead at approximately 7:28 p.m.

Defense: No cross-examination.

Dr. Andrew Capraro — Boston Children’s Hospital

Dr. Andrew Capraro treated Callan Clancy after he was transferred by medical flight from Beth Israel to Boston Children’s Hospital.

Callan had initially arrived at Beth Israel in cardiac arrest but had regained spontaneous circulation. When Capraro examined him, Callan was limp and largely unresponsive, with fixed and dilated pupils and linear ligature marks and swelling around his neck. He required a ventilator for nearly all of his breathing and an epinephrine drip to maintain adequate blood pressure.

A CT scan showed significant brain swelling caused by hypoxic-ischemic injury — severe damage resulting from insufficient oxygen and blood flow. Capraro testified that such an injury can result from strangulation and that the linear bruising on Callan’s neck was consistent with strangulation involving an object.

There was no bleeding or other condition that neurosurgeons could surgically correct, so Callan was transferred to the ICU.

Defense: No cross-examination.

Dr. David Casavant — Boston Children’s ICU

Dr. David Casavant took over Callan’s ICU care on January 26, 2023. By then, testing and examination showed a devastating neurological injury.

The CT showed what Casavant described as an “enormous amount” of brain swelling caused by lack of oxygen. He explained that seeing such extensive swelling so quickly indicated an exceptionally severe injury.

Callan was receiving no sedation despite having a breathing tube, yet showed no response to voice, touch, painful stimulation, or light directed into his pupils. His pupils remained fixed and dilated.

Boston Children’s then performed formal brain-death testing. Callan showed no neurological reflexes or spontaneous breathing response. Interestingly, the first apnea test produced a CO₂ level of 59.7, just short of the hospital’s required threshold of 60. Casavant refused to round it up or treat it as close enough and repeated the test; the second reached 87. The entire neurological assessment was repeated at least 24 hours later, again confirming the findings.

Callan was ultimately determined to have met the criteria for death by neurological criteria. After his family was given time with him, life support was withdrawn on January 27, 2023, and his heart stopped.

Defense: Again, no cross-examination.

The one detail that stands out is Casavant’s 59.7 versus 60 testimony. It isn’t particularly important to the disputed issues in the case, but it’s a striking demonstration of how rigorous the brain-death determination was. He essentially said: 59.7 is not 60, and this is too important to fudge by three-tenths of a point. This is a very clear sense of the certainty behind Callan’s eventual determination of brain death.

Sgt. Mark Mafio — Duxbury Police

Mafio was a Duxbury detective on January 24, 2023 and was called in after the incident. He initially went to the Clancy residence, then was assigned to South Shore Hospital, where he observed Lindsay unconscious and apparently sedated, with cuts to her neck and arms. He collected clothing and personal items that hospital personnel had removed from her and transferred them to Massachusetts State Police. He later returned to 47 Summer Street and was present during execution of the search warrant.

The defense used Mafio primarily to document Lindsay’s injuries and blood evidence associated with her apparent suicide attempt: blood on her clothing, in the bedroom, around the bed and nightstand, on/near the second-floor window, and outside beneath the window. The defense also emphasized that the bedroom window was open and the room was very cold.

The medication-search issue

The defense repeatedly questioned Mafio about the collection of Lindsay’s prescription bottles and specifically raised the bedside/nightstand drawer containing additional pill bottles. But Mafio couldn’t really help them: he testified that although he was in the house during the search, he did not seize the medications and wasn’t present when other officers seized them. When asked specifically whether investigators opened the nightstand drawer containing pill bottles, he said he wasn’t present and couldn’t attest to it.

The prosecution cleaned that up on redirect by establishing that this was a large, divided search involving Duxbury police, State Police and crime-scene personnel, with individuals assigned different roles/areas. Mafio himself essentially found only a laptop in a first-floor closet.

Officer Richard Leard — Duxbury Police

Leard relieved Mafio at South Shore Hospital and remained with Lindsay while she was in police custody. She appeared sedated and unresponsive and did not speak to him or anyone else he observed. He accompanied her by MedFlight to Brigham and Women’s Hospital and remained there for roughly 15–16 hours. During the night, Lindsay experienced a medical code/code blue, after which Leard was relieved the following morning by two other Duxbury officers.

Worth noting: The defense emphasized just how medically serious Lindsay’s condition was — unconscious, intubated, transported by helicopter, surrounded by lifesaving equipment, and eventually experiencing a code blue. That’s really the only substantive purpose in the cross.

Dr. Mark Tenerowicz — Dawson Clancy

Emergency physician at Beth Israel Deaconess Plymouth who treated Dawson when he arrived without a pulse or spontaneous breathing, with CPR already underway. The team continued extensive resuscitation efforts for approximately 40 minutes, in addition to what paramedics had already done, but never restored a heartbeat. Dawson was pronounced dead at 7:28 p.m.

The defense asked essentially one substantive question, clarifying that bruising observed on Dawson’s lower legs appeared older and that an intraosseous line had been inserted into his tibia.

Dr. Benjamin Kaufman — Callan Clancy

Kaufman treated Callan, who also arrived with CPR underway, without spontaneous breathing and with his heart stopped. Unlike Dawson, Callan’s heartbeat returned approximately 10 minutes after arriving in the ER, following treatment including epinephrine. However, he never breathed independently and showed no observable neurological response; Kaufman assessed him at a Glasgow Coma Scale of 3, the lowest score. Callan was transferred by helicopter to Boston Children’s Hospital. The defense asked no questions.

Melissa Arcadipane — South Shore Hospital Laboratory

Pure chain-of-custody witness. She explained that law enforcement issued a preservation notice for Lindsay’s blood and urine collected at South Shore Hospital. Those samples were segregated and preserved, and on January 31, 2023, Arcadipane turned the preserved specimens over to a Massachusetts State Police trooper pursuant to a warrant. The prosecution referenced six vials of blood and one vial of urine, although Arcadipane herself couldn’t independently remember the exact number/type. She did specifically remember verifying that the specimens belonged to Lindsay. No cross-examination.

Robert Costanzo — Pembroke Firefighter/Paramedic

Costanzo treated Lindsay, rather than the children.

Pembroke responded as mutual aid. When Costanzo arrived, Lindsay had already been immobilized on a backboard with a cervical collar. She was unresponsive but breathing, moaning/groaning but not speaking. Her wrists had already been bandaged, with no blood seeping through, and through openings in the cervical collar he could see what he characterized as superficial lacerations on her neck with no active bleeding. He saw no obvious head injury or broken bones during the limited assessment they could perform while she remained immobilized.

During transport to South Shore Hospital, Costanzo noticed Lindsay’s constricted pupils and unresponsiveness and administered 2 mg of Narcan because those signs raised the possibility of an opioid overdose. She became somewhat more agitated and began reaching/grabbing with her arms, but never fully awakened or communicated verbally. Costanzo emphasized that Narcan is used for opioids; they do not administer it as treatment for benzodiazepines.

The cross-examination matters here.

Reddington challenged the prosecution’s characterization of Lindsay’s wounds as “superficial.” He established that:

Costanzo did not know at the time about Lindsay’s extensive spinal, thoracic and other internal injuries from the fall.
The backyard was very dark.
Costanzo’s direct view of her neck was restricted by the cervical collar.
Lindsay had been outside in very cold temperatures for an unknown amount of time.
Costanzo agreed that hypothermia can affect blood flow, although he could not say what effect it actually had on Lindsay’s bleeding.
He suggested her limited reaction after Narcan could also be consistent with head injury.

The prosecution’s redirect was pretty effective, though: Costanzo spent approximately 18 minutes with Lindsay inside the well-lit ambulance and never saw blood soaking through her wrist bandages or pooling/flowing from her neck. The prosecutor also asked whether he knew that the wrist wound wasn’t sutured until the following day and the neck wound was never sutured; Costanzo correctly said he didn’t know that subsequent medical information.

Main point: This is where we’re seeing the parties begin fighting over the significance of Lindsay’s self-inflicted wounds. The prosecution is clearly building “these were relatively superficial cuts” while the defense is countering with “you cannot judge their seriousness from bleeding observed after she’d been lying outside in freezing conditions, and you didn’t know the extent of her traumatic injuries.”

Vincent Cahill — Duxbury Police Officer

Cahill arrived within a couple of minutes of the approximately 6:11 p.m. dispatch, saw Lindsay being treated outside, heard screaming, and went into the basement. He encountered Patrick screaming and directing responders toward the children.

Cahill checked Cora and found no pulse, then checked Callan and also found no pulse. Once firefighters arrived and took over medical care, Cahill moved furniture to create room for responders, retrieved equipment, and later assisted Josephine with CPR/rescue breathing on Cora.

He was subsequently assigned to maintain the crime-scene entry/exit log, documenting everyone entering and leaving the scene. The log was admitted as an exhibit. No defense cross.

Main point: Mostly scene-chain corroboration plus authentication of the entry/exit log.

Keith Netti — Duxbury Fire Captain/Paramedic

Netti was off duty when the department issued the recall for additional personnel. He responded in his personal vehicle and was directed almost immediately to Dawson in the ambulance, where CPR was already underway.

He described Dawson as blue/white, unresponsive, not breathing and without a pulse, with dark red marks around his neck. Netti and the other paramedics attempted advanced resuscitation, including CPR, an IO line into the bone, epinephrine and intubation. None restored a heartbeat or spontaneous breathing, including during transport to Beth Israel Plymouth.

At the hospital, Netti also briefly assisted with compressions when another Clancy child arrived and later saw Patrick, whom he described as visibly upset. The defense asked no questions.

Main point: Medical corroboration of Dawson’s condition and extensive unsuccessful resuscitation efforts.

Patrick Dwyer — Duxbury Firefighter/Paramedic

Dwyer responded from Station 2 with Jennifer Stratton. Like the other responders, he had no information beforehand that children were involved.

Once directed into the basement, he found Cora and Callan on the floor, with Patrick sitting nearby. Dwyer immediately began treating Cora, who was in cardiac arrest. He described her as pale/bluish, with apparent burst blood vessels around her eyes, no pulse and no spontaneous breathing. After having his memory refreshed from his earlier statement, he also recalled blood in her mouth.

CPR and ventilation continued. Cora was eventually removed through the bulkhead and transported by Marshfield ambulance to Beth Israel Plymouth. She was defibrillated once during transport but did not regain a pulse.

Again, no defense questions.

Main point: More corroboration of Cora’s condition, particularly the eye findings, blood in her mouth and unsuccessful resuscitation.

Jennifer Stratton — Duxbury Firefighter/Paramedic

Stratton arrived with Dwyer. Initially she saw Lindsay outside being treated, but then heard someone yelling for responders to get inside because there was a child in the basement.

She and Dwyer found Cora and Callan lying face-up. Stratton immediately requested two additional ambulances and began treating eight-month-old Callan.

Callan had no pulse and was not breathing. Stratton performed infant CPR and ventilation while additional responders arrived. Attempts to establish IO access were unsuccessful. She described “deep strangulation marks around the entire circumference of his neck.”

Callan never regained a pulse or spontaneous breathing at the house or during transport. Stratton ultimately picked him up and carried him from the basement herself to the Kingston ambulance and accompanied him to Beth Israel Plymouth.

The defense did not cross-examine her.

Main point: Her description of Callan’s neck is probably the important evidentiary piece here. Unlike some of the more general descriptions of “marks,” Stratton specifically described deep marks encircling the entire neck.

Captain P.J. Husey – Duxbury Fire Department

Husey testified that he had been a firefighter for 32 years and a paramedic for approximately 17 years. In January 2023, he was a Duxbury Fire Department captain and shift commander responsible for overseeing fire and medical operations during his shift.

1. This is independent corroboration of Patrick removing something from Dawson’s neck.

Husey wasn’t standing beside Patrick. He was outside looking through the basement window immediately after hearing the scream. From that vantage point, he saw Patrick making a circular unwrapping motion, taking something from around Dawson’s head/neck.

That becomes particularly useful alongside Patrick’s own testimony and the officers’ testimony about the exercise bands. We’re starting to get several independent pieces of the scene fitting together.

2. The sequence is important.

Husey’s account gives us:

Lindsay is already outside being treated → Husey hears Patrick scream → looks through basement window → sees Patrick with Dawson → sees him removing something from Dawson’s head/neck → immediately calls for more resources.

That independently anchors the discovery of Dawson to after first responders were already treating Lindsay outside.

It also fits neatly with Hall and Josephine hearing the same scream and then running into the house.

3. Husey saw Dawson’s head/face was already blue.

That corroborates Hall and Josephine’s observations of significant discoloration. Three responders are now independently describing pronounced discoloration essentially immediately upon discovery.

4. His staffing testimony explains the seemingly messy responder sequence.

There was initially one ambulance staffed, even though Duxbury owned three. Once they realized they had four critically injured people instead of one, Husey had to recall personnel and request mutual aid.

So people shifting between patients, officers assisting with CPR, responders carrying children themselves, etc., makes sense in context. They went from responding to what appeared to be one seriously injured woman after a fall to suddenly dealing with Lindsay plus three critically injured children.

His phrase that it became “very chaotic very quickly” is probably the best description of it.

5. The scream.

Hall heard it. Josephine heard it. Husey heard it from outside and identified it as coming from the basement.

That gives pretty strong independent corroboration of Patrick’s immediate emotional reaction upon finding Dawson.

Loring “Chuck” Nudd – Duxbury firefighter/EMT

Nudd, who had more than 30 years with the department. His primary role that evening was with the ambulance that ultimately transported Dawson.

The responders initially knew nothing about the children. This continues to strengthen the timeline we’ve been developing. Fire/EMS arrived expecting one patient—Lindsay, following a second-story fall. The discovery of Dawson occurred after they arrived. That’s now established through multiple independent witnesses.

Dawson’s condition is independently corroborated again. Nudd saw him essentially the instant he was brought out of the house: blue face, pale body, visible marks around his neck, not breathing, and no pulse/cardiac activity initially detected. That closely matches Hall, Josephine and Husey’s descriptions.

One wording distinction is important: Nudd said he could not determine pulse/cardiac activity upon his initial assessment. He isn’t giving us a definitive medical pronouncement about Dawson’s status beyond that moment.

The monitor being removed is another sign of how overwhelmed the scene became. They were treating Dawson in the ambulance but disconnected equipment because it was also needed for the patients downstairs. That fits Husey’s description of the response becoming “very chaotic very quickly.”

Steven Hall – Ducksberry Police Department.

Duxbury Police Officer Stephen Hall testified that he was dispatched to 47 Summer Street at approximately 6:11 p.m. on January 24, 2023, arriving about 7–10 minutes later at roughly the same time as Officer Brian Josephine. They went to the backyard after hearing Patrick Clancy calling for them.

Hall found Lindsay Clancy lying outside near the window well, with her head toward the house and feet pointing away. She had cuts on both wrists and the left side of her neck, but none were actively bleeding and Hall did not believe those wounds themselves required immediate treatment. Lindsay was semi-conscious, drifting in and out of consciousness, moving mainly her head, unable to speak, and moaning as though she were in pain.

While first responders began treating Lindsay, Patrick went inside to check on the children. Hall then heard dispatch report that Patrick “couldn’t wake them up,” followed shortly afterward by a loud scream from inside the house. Hall became emotional at this point in his testimony and had to take a moment to recover. Hall and Josephine ran inside. They heard Patrick in the basement saying words to the effect of “I can’t wake them up. I can’t get them up.”

Hall first entered the right side of the basement, described as a workout area, and found Dawson lying on his back in the back room, shirtless and apparently wearing only a diaper or underwear. Dawson appeared bluish-purple/discolored. Hall summoned paramedics, and Josephine carried Dawson outside to the ambulance. Hall specifically noticed an exercise band in the area where Dawson had been found.

Because Patrick had referred to “them,” Hall and Josephine returned to search for additional children. On the other side of the basement, Hall saw Cora and Callan lying motionless while EMTs and paramedics worked on them. Hall attempted to assist by locating equipment requested by the medical personnel.

Hall later returned outside to Lindsay. He observed an open upper-story window and blood marks around the window and on the shingles beneath it. Importantly, he testified that he did not see a ripped or torn window screen on the ground. While paramedics treated Lindsay, she repeatedly removed her oxygen mask, and Hall repeatedly replaced it before helping move her stretcher to the ambulance.

The defense asked no substantive questions; Reddington simply thanked Hall for his service.

Officer Brian Josephine

1. Josephine gives us an even tighter arrival time.
Dispatch was approximately 6:11 p.m., and Josephine estimates only 3–4 minutes to reach the house. So we now have an officer potentially on scene by roughly 6:14–6:15 p.m. Hall’s estimate of his own arrival was later, although Hall believed they arrived essentially simultaneously. 

2. “She killed the kids” is significant.

This is probably the biggest new fact from Josephine. Patrick apparently made that statement immediately upon encountering the officers in the basement after finding Dawson. There is no indication here that anyone had told Patrick what happened beforehand. It therefore helps establish Patrick’s immediate reaction and what he believed had happened at the moment of discovery.

It also potentially corroborates Patrick’s testimony about what Lindsay had told him outside/over the phone before he found the children.

3. The prosecution is very deliberately establishing that Lindsay’s cutting wounds were not life-threatening.

They didn’t merely ask what Josephine saw. They walked him through:

his first-aid training;
the fact that officers carry tourniquets and gauze;
when a tourniquet would be necessary;
whether he thought Lindsay needed one;
and finally whether the wounds appeared life-threatening.

Answer: No.

That feels purposeful rather than incidental. The prosecution appears to be building evidence about the nature/severity of Lindsay’s apparent self-inflicted injuries, perhaps for later comparison with the much more serious act of jumping from the window or with evidence concerning suicidal intent.

4. Slight Hall/Josephine differences aren’t especially meaningful, but record them.

Hall remembered cuts to both wrists and the left side of Lindsay’s neck, with no active bleeding. Josephine remembered a cut to the right wrist and right side of the neck, and said they were bleeding but not profusely.

That’s exactly the kind of minor discrepancy you’d expect from two officers arriving at a chaotic emergency scene three years earlier. More importantly, both agree the wounds did not require immediate intervention.

5. Josephine gives much more medical-looking observational evidence about the children.

This testimony establishes observable physical conditions—not medical conclusions:

Dawson: pale/gray face, blue lips, bloodshot eyes/apparent broken vessels, red marks on neck, mucus/foam from mouth.

Cora: similar discoloration and eye findings, plus dried blood around the mouth and substantial blood on the floor.

6. The blood near Cora.

Josephine described enough blood on the basement floor that it soaked through his pants while he performed CPR, causing him to move Cora slightly so he could continue compressions. That’s much more substantial than simply saying there was blood at the scene. 

7. Callan possibly had a faint pulse.

Josephine didn’t claim that he personally detected it. He said responders “mentioned” that they might have found a faint pulse, which he believed was why Callan was transported before Cora. 

Overall significance

This is still primarily crime-scene/emergency-response testimony, but Josephine gives us considerably more than Hall.

The prosecution seems to be accomplishing three things with him

establishing the immediate aftermath
documenting the physical evidence consistent with the children’s neck compression
establishing that Lindsay’s wrist/neck wounds themselves did not appear life-threatening

And Patrick’s spontaneous “She killed the kids” statement is probably the single most important piece to pull from Josephine for the larger narrative.

READ:  Lindsay Clancy Murder Trial – Day 1 & 2: Patrick Clancy Testimony

Patrick Clancy Direct Examination Continues

Angela Krause – CVS Pharmacy

Saria Sweeny Shelgren – ThreeV Restaurant, hostess, testified that the call from Lindsay Clancy for takeout was of no concern and normal demeanor.

Patrick Clancy Cross Examination and Redirect. 

Lindsay Clancy Murder Trial Day 1: Opening Statements

Judge Grants Patrick Clancy’s Motion to Restrict Public Access to Sensitive Evidence

Just days before opening statements, Judge William F. Sullivan has granted Patrick Clancy’s request to limit public dissemination of some of the trial’s most sensitive evidence.

Under the ruling:

The 911 call Patrick Clancy made on January 24, 2023 may not be recorded, broadcast, reproduced, or publicly distributed by the media.
Autopsy photographs of Cora, Dawson, and Callan Clancy are subject to the same restrictions.
The order also applies to members of the public attending the trial, prohibiting them from recording or distributing this evidence.

Importantly, the ruling does not prevent the evidence from being presented during trial. Jurors, attorneys, witnesses, and everyone physically present in the courtroom will still hear the 911 call and view the photographs if they are introduced into evidence. Reporters are also free to describe what occurs in court, but they cannot publish the audio or images themselves.

Judge Sullivan wrote that public dissemination of these materials would create a “substantial likelihood of harm” to Patrick Clancy and the children’s family, while still preserving the public’s ability to follow the proceedings through courtroom reporting.

This ruling strikes a balance between open court proceedings and protecting the privacy and dignity of the victims’ family, ensuring the jury will see all of the evidence while limiting its permanent public distribution.

July 23 Trial Update: Jury Selected, Trial Begins Monday

➤ Jury empanelment complete, 18 jurors, six men and 12 women, are now seated. However, according to Law and Crime/CourtTV reporter Cathy Russon, it seems there was another issue with another juror, and they might possibly have to make due with 17 jurors. One of them has to check with an employer. 

➤The judge recessed proceedings until Monday, July 27 at 9:00 a.m., when opening statements are expected to begin.

➤ Patrick Clancy’s request remains under advisement. His attorney asked the court to restrict public dissemination—not jury access—of certain evidence, including the 911 recording, photographs of the children, autopsy images, and the children’s clothing. The judge said he would issue a written ruling on the request.

➤ Commonwealth did not oppose every request. Prosecutors indicated they would defer to the court regarding publication of the 911 recording, while agreeing autopsy photographs should not be broadcast. They opposed restricting publication of the children’s clothing, arguing the garments themselves were not especially graphic.

➤ Defense sought limits on repetitive witnesses. Defense attorney Kevin Reddington argued that calling numerous firefighters, EMTs, and police officers to describe the same events could unfairly inflame jurors, since the circumstances of the children’s deaths are not disputed.

➤ Judge declined to limit witnesses in advance. Instead, he said he will evaluate objections during trial, deciding witness-by-witness whether testimony becomes unnecessarily cumulative.

Analysis

The hearing offered an early glimpse into how Judge Canavan intends to manage this trial. Rather than issuing broad pretrial restrictions, he repeatedly signaled he will address evidentiary disputes as they arise, balancing the Commonwealth’s right to present its case against the defense’s concerns about undue prejudice. That approach suggests the judge intends to closely supervise how emotionally charged evidence is presented to the jury throughout the trial.

Patrick Clancy Seeks to Restrict Public Access to 911 Call and Graphic Evidence as Jury Selection Nears Completion

As jury selection in the Lindsay Clancy murder trial nears completion, a new motion filed by Patrick Clancy is asking the court to limit public access to some of the trial’s most sensitive evidence.

According to court filings, Patrick Clancy is requesting that the public be prevented from hearing the 911 call he made after discovering his children and that certain photographs and exhibits involving the children be withheld from public viewing during the trial. The request does not seek to exclude this evidence from the jury. Instead, it asks the court to restrict what members of the public and media are permitted to hear or see while the evidence is presented in open court.

This is a separate issue from earlier pretrial rulings, in which the court addressed whether the prosecution could introduce the 911 call as evidence at trial. That issue concerned admissibility before the jury. The current motion focuses on public access to evidence that may already be admitted.

The request highlights the difficult balance courts often face between protecting the privacy and dignity of victims’ families and preserving the long-standing principle that criminal trials are conducted openly. While requests to shield particularly graphic photographs are not uncommon, efforts to restrict public access to audio evidence such as a 911 call raise broader questions about transparency in the judicial process.

Meanwhile, jury selection continued Wednesday. Eighteen jurors were initially seated, but one prospective juror was later excused, leaving the court with 17 jurors. One additional juror must still be selected before the jury can be sworn and opening statements can begin. Court proceedings are expected to resume Thursday morning.

Justice Case Analysis will continue to monitor the proceedings and provide updates as soon as the court rules on Patrick Clancy’s motion and announces the schedule for opening statements.

Judge Conditionally Excludes Additional Defense Experts as Jury Selection Begins

Before jury selection began Monday morning, Judge William F. Sullivan ruled on a prosecution motion seeking to exclude several expert witnesses recently disclosed by the defense.

The Commonwealth argued that four witnesses identified in the defense’s July 7 witness list—including an emergency room physician, crime scene reconstruction expert, and forensic pathologist —were expert witnesses who had not been properly disclosed under Massachusetts discovery rules. Prosecutors contended they had not received reports or opinions that would allow them to prepare for cross-examination.

Defense attorney Kevin Reddington responded that the witnesses were largely consulting experts whose testimony would depend on how the Commonwealth presents its case. He argued he could not determine whether they would ultimately be needed until hearing the prosecution’s opening statement and evidence. Reddington emphasized that the defense had already provided complete disclosures for its three criminal responsibility experts.

Judge Sullivan agreed that the issue was premature but ultimately allowed the Commonwealth’s motion for now, ruling that the additional experts may not testify unless circumstances change during trial.

Importantly, the judge left the door open for the defense to revisit the issue. He stated that if the Commonwealth’s opening statement or expert testimony goes beyond previously disclosed opinions or raises unexpected issues, the defense may renew its request to call the additional experts.

The ruling is procedural rather than substantive. The defense’s primary psychiatric experts on criminal responsibility remain unaffected. The judge simply postponed any decision on these additional witnesses until it becomes clear whether their testimony is actually necessary in response to the Commonwealth’s evidence.

With that ruling complete, the court recessed briefly before bringing prospective jurors into the courtroom to begin jury selection.

READ:

9 Important Details Media Overlooked: Lindsay Clancy Pretrial Hearing

➤ Prosecutors Drop Three “Redundant” Charges

This sounds more significant than it actually is.

The Commonwealth voluntarily dismissed the three strangulation or suffocation charges before trial, explaining that they are legally subsumed within the three first-degree murder charges because the alleged murders themselves were committed by strangulation. The factual allegations have not changed, and prosecutors will still present evidence that the children died from ligature strangulation.

Lindsay Clancy continues to face:

Three counts of First-Degree Murder
Three counts of Assault & Battery with a Dangerous Weapon

The prosecution described the dismissed strangulation counts as legally redundant rather than a change in its theory of the case.

The judge allowed prosecutors to play Patrick Clancy’s 911 call for the jury.

The ruling apparently comes with a limiting instruction to jurors regarding how they should consider the evidence

What the Ruling Could Mean at Trial

The judge’s decision to allow Patrick Clancy’s 911 call gives prosecutors one of the most emotionally powerful pieces of evidence they have. Unlike testimony offered months or years after the tragedy, a 911 call captures events as they unfold. Jurors will hear Patrick’s immediate reactions, his descriptions of what he found, and the urgency of the moments before first responders arrived.

For the prosecution, the recording may help establish the sequence of events and reinforce its theory that the killings were deliberate rather than impulsive. Because the call was made within minutes of the discovery, prosecutors are also likely to argue that Patrick’s statements carry particular credibility as contemporaneous observations rather than memories shaped over time.

The defense, however, is expected to focus jurors on a different issue. Lindsay Clancy is not contesting that she caused the deaths of her children. Instead, her defense centers on whether she was legally criminally responsible because of her mental condition. The defense may argue that while the 911 call is undeniably emotional, it does little to answer the central question jurors must ultimately decide: Lindsay Clancy’s state of mind at the time of the killings.

The recording also presents a challenge for the jury. Judges generally instruct jurors not to let sympathy or emotion influence their verdict, but 911 calls are often among the most compelling pieces of evidence presented at trial. Jurors will be asked to separate the emotional impact of Patrick’s desperate pleas for help from the legal questions surrounding criminal responsibility—a distinction that may prove difficult throughout the trial.

Pretrial Hearing – Key Developments

(based on the hearing transcript)

➤Trial remains on schedule.

➤Final pretrial conference: July 13, 2026

➤Jury selection (impanelment): July 20, 2026

➤Judge considering a juror questionnaire. Although both sides generally prefer live questioning, the judge is considering a short written
questionnaire focused on psychiatric and medication-related issues because of the complexity of the case.
A final decision will be made on July 13.

➤Lindsay Clancy’s parents and sister may remain in the courtroom. Prosecutors wanted them sequestered until after they testified.
The judge denied that request and ruled that Lindsay’s mother, father, and sister may remain despite the Commonwealth’s objection.

➤Lay witnesses will be limited in what they can say about Lindsay’s mental condition. Friends and family may describe what they personally observed. They generally may not offer medical or psychiatric opinions or interpret the effects of medications. The judge emphasized those opinions belong to qualified experts.

➤The judge clarified an important evidentiary issue involving expert witnesses. The Commonwealth sought to prevent defense-retained experts from repeating Lindsay Clancy’s own statements to evaluators as substantive evidence. During argument, the judge clarified that this restriction applies to retained experts—not to treating physicians whose testimony may be admissible under other evidentiary rules.

➤The jury will visit the crime scene. Despite objections from the current homeowner, the judge approved a jury view of:

the Clancy residence
the CVS
and 3A Restaurant

The court will issue logistical orders intended to minimize disruption to the homeowner.

➤The Commonwealth may present photographs of the children while they were alive. Defense did not object.
The prosecution plans to introduce one photo of each child along with one family photograph showing all three together.

➤Autopsy photographs will largely be addressed during trial. The judge indicated some photographs will likely be admitted but will review specific images before they are shown to the jury.

➤The prosecution may use a digital 3D model of the Clancy home. The model will be used as a demonstrative aid (“chalk”) to help jurors understand witness testimony. Defense raised no general objection but reserved the right to challenge specific uses during trial.

➤Bloodstain pattern evidence is still unresolved. Prosecutors want to conduct a live courtroom demonstration illustrating blood transfer, drips, and spatter. Defense argued the proposed demonstration involves unreliable “junk science.” Rather than rule immediately, the judge ordered a separate evidentiary hearing before deciding whether the demonstration will be allowed. This may become one of the more closely watched evidentiary issues before trial.

➤Patrick Clancy’s 911 call is likely to be admitted. Defense acknowledged that Massachusetts law strongly favors admission as an excited utterance. The judge indicated he is inclined to admit the recording after personally reviewing it for any necessary redactions.

➤Expert discovery is essentially complete. Both sides confirmed that nearly all expert reports have been exchanged, with only minor amendments or one remaining defense report expected.

➤Estimated trial length: four to six weeks.

➤Prosecutors advised witnesses to expect anywhere from four to eight weeks, while the judge told jurors the expected estimate would likely be four to six weeks.

Prosecution Files Additional Pretrial Motions Ahead of Final Pretrial Hearing

📌 The Commonwealth has filed several additional pretrial motions in advance of the June 18 final pretrial hearing.

📌 Prosecutors are asking the court to allow jurors to hear Patrick Clancy’s complete 911 call, arguing that statements made during the call are relevant to proving deliberation and the manner in which the children were killed.

📌 According to court filings summarized by multiple news outlets, prosecutors argue that evidence concerning the placement and tightening of the exercise bands is relevant to the charges of First-Degree Murder and the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.

📌 The Commonwealth has asked the court to prohibit lay witnesses from offering opinions about Lindsay Clancy’s mental state, limiting such testimony to observations rather than medical or psychiatric conclusions.

📌 Prosecutors are requesting that witnesses be sequestered during trial to prevent them from hearing the testimony of other witnesses before they testify.

📌 The Commonwealth has proposed additional voir dire questions concerning prospective jurors’ personal or family experiences with mental illness, recognizing that mental health issues will be central to the defense.

📌 Prosecutors are also seeking permission for jurors to view the former Clancy residence, as well as the CVS pharmacy and restaurant Patrick Clancy visited on the day of the homicides, arguing that an in-person view would assist jurors in understanding the timeline and physical layout.

📌 Additional motions seek admission of family photographs, crime scene photographs, and autopsy photographs as evidence at trial.

📌The court is expected to address these motions during the final pretrial hearing scheduled for June 18, 2026.

May 28, 2026: A status conference was held in Plymouth Superior Court.

📌Both sides reported that discovery is nearly complete, with only two examiner reports remaining outstanding at the time of the hearing.

📌Prosecutors disclosed a tentative witness list containing approximately 168 potential witnesses, though many are laboratory and foundational witnesses required for evidentiary purposes.

📌Defense attorney Kevin Reddington stated the defense expects to call approximately 50 witnesses, with significant overlap between the defense and prosecution witness lists.

📌Both parties reported ongoing cooperation regarding discovery and evidence exchange.

📌Prosecutors confirmed they will seek a jury view of the former Clancy residence, but the current homeowner plans to oppose the request through counsel. The issue will be argued at the next hearing.

📌The final pretrial conference is scheduled for June 18, 2026, at 2:00 p.m., where motions in limine, jury issues, and the status of expert reports are expected to be addressed. Lindsay Clancy is expected to appear in person.

A status hearing was held yesterday in the case of Lindsay Clancy, focusing on pretrial logistics and the current posture of the case following recent motion activity.

Key Takeaways:

No major rulings issued at this hearing. The court did not take up new substantive motions.
Bifurcation issue remains settled (for now). The judge’s prior denial of the defense request to split the trial still stands, with no indication of immediate reconsideration.
Case continues moving toward trial. Both sides appear to be proceeding under the assumption of a unified trial structure (guilt + criminal responsibility together).
Ongoing pretrial coordination. The hearing primarily addressed scheduling, discovery status, and general readiness.

Notable Context:

The defense has recently attempted to revisit strategy following the denial of bifurcation, including filings that raised questions about how mental health evidence will be presented.
No new evidentiary disputes were formally resolved on the record during this session.

⚖️ Analysis Snapshot 

This was a maintenance hearing, not a turning point. The biggest issue—whether the trial would be split—has already been decided, and the case is now moving forward under that framework.

Unless the defense successfully pushes a reconsideration (which appears unlikely), the next meaningful developments will likely come from motions in limine (what the jury will and won’t hear), and final trial scheduling.

March 2, 2026 Motion Hearing – Key Developments

📌 Clancy’s attorney Kevin Reddington asked the court to split the trial into two separate phases (bifurcation).

➤ The proposed structure:

Phase 1: The jury would determine whether Clancy committed the acts alleged by the prosecution.

Phase 2: If the jury finds she committed the acts, a second phase would determine whether she was criminally responsible (insanity defense).

📌 Defense argument

Reddington argued that combining guilt and mental-responsibility evidence in a single trial would force Clancy to effectively incriminate herself while presenting an insanity defense. He suggested a two-stage trial would better protect her Fifth Amendment rights.

📌 Prosecution opposition

➤ Prosecutors opposed the request, arguing that Massachusetts law does not require bifurcation in this situation.

➤ The evidence and witnesses for both phases would largely overlap, meaning the case would essentially be presented twice.

➤ By raising an insanity defense, Clancy has already waived certain Fifth Amendment protections, particularly regarding psychiatric evaluations.

📌 Judge’s response

➤ Judge Sullivan did not rule immediately on the bifurcation motion and said that he would take the matter under advisement and issue a decision later.

📌 Upcoming procedural steps

➤ Clancy is expected to undergo a state psychiatric evaluation ahead of trial April 10-12, 2026.

➤ Another court date was set for late April 23, 2026 after the evaluation.

➤ A final trial conference is scheduled for June 18, 2026.

➤ The trial is currently scheduled to begin July 20, 2026.

February 20, 2026 – First In-Person Court Appearance

🟡Clancy physically appeared in court for the first time on Friday, February 20, 2026, at Plymouth Superior Court.

🟡She arrived in a wheelchair; it was her first in-person hearing since the January 2023 deaths of her children.

🟡Lawyers discussed procedural matters and pending motions in anticipation of the July 20 trial date — especially motions regarding discovery and defense strategy.

🟡A big point of debate is a defense request to bifurcate the trial — essentially asking the court to split the proceedings into two parts:

Whether she committed the acts in question

Whether she was legally insane at the time

🟡The judge set a March 2, 2026 motions hearing to take up those and other issues.

🟡This hearing also covered the status of discovery (what evidence each side has shared).

🗓️ Defense Motion to Separate Verdicts

🟡Around the same mid-February period, word came out that Clancy’s defense wants the trial structured so that first, the jury decides guilt; then, a second phase would address her mental state and insanity defense.

🟡Prosecutors have not agreed to this split and are opposing some aspects of that motion, meaning it will need to be argued and decided at upcoming hearings (starting March 2).

Note: Bifurcation is rare in murder cases and would significantly shape trial strategy and narrative.

📌 Support and Personal Context at Court

Clancy’s parents attended the February hearing in person, underscoring the emotional and family aspects being presented alongside legal strategy.

Her attorney continues to highlight her ongoing mental health struggles and risk of self-harm if her medical needs aren’t properly addressed during the trial process.

🔜 Upcoming Scheduled Court Dates

March 2, 2026: Motion hearing on bifurcation request and other pretrial motions.

April 10, 2026: Mental health evaluation by a prosecutor-appointed expert (reported in media previews).

June 18, 2026: Final pretrial conference scheduled.

July 20, 2026: Trial is currently set to begin.

1. Transportation & Medical Logistics Dominated the Discussion
The main subject was how Clancy will be brought to and from court during her murder trial, set for July 20, 2026. Clancy is currently confined at Tewksbury State Hospital, paralyzed from the chest down after a suicide attempt following the deaths of her three children. Her defense argues she should be transported by ambulance because of her severe medical needs. The sheriff’s office says it can use a wheelchair-accessible van instead.

2. Defense Warns of Serious Health and Safety Concerns
Her attorney, Kevin Reddington, told the court that Clancy’s condition — including lack of motor control and “significant suicidal ideation” — makes logistics extremely complicated. He even warned that Clancy could harm herself again if her needs aren’t met during the trial.

3. Judge Will Create a Custom Order
Judge William F. Sullivan acknowledged the complexity and said he intends to draft a specific order regarding transport and accommodations, based on medical input from Clancy’s caregivers. But he also indicated this may not be the last hearing on these issues; adjustments are likely as details get ironed out.

4. Psychiatric & Discovery Issues Still Ongoing
There’s also ongoing work next steps on medical records, psychiatric evaluations, and expert witness exchanges ahead of trial. Both sides have been ordered to provide more information and there’s a follow-up hearing scheduled January 27.

5. Hearing Was Held Virtually
Clancy herself did not attend in person — she appeared via Zoom from Tewksbury — and spoke minimally.

At a December 2025 hearing, the court approved a joint request from the defense and prosecution to delay the trial, citing the complexity of the case and the volume of outstanding discovery, particularly related to psychiatric evaluations and expert evidence. The judge agreed the matter remains “discovery-intensive” and granted the continuance.

The trial is now scheduled to begin on July 20, 2026. The next status hearing is set for January 27, 2026, with a final pretrial conference scheduled for July 13, 2026.